Comparing the remarkable economic growth of Japan and South Korea (hereafter , Korea), many scholars have adopted the modernization theory and/or the stages theory of development. They argue that development is about the modernization of traditional societies . Moreover, it is also widely accepted that developing countries could and should learn from the pioneer countries that have already developed. However, they fail to explain the opposite side of the remarkable economic growth in both countries; namely rapid depopulation and wide collapse of rural communities.
Introduction
Since the 1960s Japan has experienced rapid rural depopulation and wide collapse of local communities.
Japanese scholars call these phe nomena 'Kaso', which means, "very scarce and/ or too depopulated".
At the same time, the Japanese government enacted the "Urgent Measures for Depopulated Areas Act" (in Japa nese, 'Kaso-ho'), and started to pour investments into Kaso areas. The total amount of invest ments during the period 1970-1990 was more than 25 billion Yen, and almost half of it has been used for the improvement of roads. As a result, the depopulation rate of Kaso areas in Japan continuously dropped from 12.9 percent during the period of 1965-70 to 4.1 percent during the period of 1980 -85. However, during 1985 the depopulation rate of Kaso areas in Japan increased again to 5.8 percent with slight fluctuation thereafterl.
This rise in the depop ulation rate was the result of the increase in mortality rather than rural-to-urban migration. More than three decades of continued depopu lation resulted in a high ratio of aged popula tion. This in turn has caused the recent in crease in mortality. As of 1990, the ratio of over 65-years of age of Kaso areas in Japan is ex tremely high, at more than 20 percent (Kim 1997a) . Despite declining depopulation rates, one third of municipalities in Japan remain as Kaso municipalities.
These trends suggest that while tremendous investments in Kaso areas since 1970 have played a key role in decreasing the depopulation rates of these areas, they could not solve the regional problems of rural Japan.
industrialization to catch up with the Japanese success story, rural Korea lost more than half of its population to cities between 1970 and 1990 . Approximately a quarter of the rural popula tion out-migrated in the 1970s, and 35 percent in the 1980s. This meant that the largest por tion of rural Korea lost its population at an annual rate of over 3 percent during the twenty years (Kim 1995) . Nevertheless, the Central Government of Korea is more apt to invest financially in urban areas, resulting in the un derdevelopment of infrastructure in rural areas. With regard to these trends in Japan and Korea, the most remarkable common character istic is the short time frame of these dramatic changes within the rural areas. It should be noted that the transformation of most over populated areas to underpopulated areas within only two decades did not occur in Europe nor in other parts of Asia. At the moment, the depopulation phenomenon both in Japan and Korea can be called `the industrial disease', which contains cultural overtones.
Roughly speaking, there have been two theoretical viewpoints on the Kaso phenome non in Japan. One is an optimistic viewpoint, which regards it as a process of achieving a balance in the suitable distribution of resources and labor force; the other is pessimistic, which sees it as a process of imbalance and/or peri pheralization (Okahashi 1996) . More than 30 years since the Kaso phenomenon rose as a social issue in Japan, however, the balanced situation which neoclassical economists in sisted on, has not yet emerged. Instead, Kaso areas themselves underwent reorganization, thereby gaining a base for existence, even if hardly a sufficient one (Okahashi 1996) , by depending mainly on financial support from the Central Government.
This should be called "more constructive peripheralization" and is by no means an escape from the Kaso phenome non.
Similarly to the Japanese situation, many re gional planners in Korea argued that the Kaso phenomenon would be an unavoidable step to wards equilibrium between a few growth centers and their backward areas. And they insisted that though it would be painful, trickle down effects would appear soon. On the aca demic side, however, some scholars were criti cal of the gap between the time wait and to be able to wait, even if the trickle down effects became a reality (Yu 1984) . And a serious Kaso phenomenon is still going on with little finan cial transfer from the Central Government to rural areas in Korea.
Comparing the remarkable economic growth of Japan and Korea, many scholars have adopted the modernization theory and/or the stages theory of development.
Modernization theorists believe that developed societies were distinguished by their economic, social, cultural and political modernity, which contrast sharply with the traditional values of underdeveloped, developing, backward, Third World or latecom er societies.
Development is thus about the modernization of traditional societies (Hoselitz 1952) . Moreover, it is also widely accepted that developing countries could and should learn from the pioneer countries that have already developed. Walt Whitman Rostow is known for the view that there is a common pathway to development which has to be trod by all coun tries intent on becoming modern (Rostow 1960) . According to these arguments, Korea should follow the same pathway Japan trod, and Japan should go through the experience that western developing countries have had. Then, the accompanied distortion will be conse quently solved when they catch up with the leading countries? This is questionable. Mod ernization theories fail to explain 'the industrial disease' mentioned above, nor do they consider the modernization of non-European countries.
This study is an attempt to build an alterna tive theoretical framework for sustainable de velopment of rural communities in East Asia, focusing on Japan and Korea. The endogenous self-organization that functions as a substantial social unit for rural development will be emphasized. The socioeconomic foundation of endogenous self-organizations will be pre sented with respect to three kinds of cost: namely negotiation cost with the administra tion, bargaining cost in the market and commu nity organizing cost. To accomplish this pur pose, the case of each country will be intro duced.
The two countries differ from each other in their methods of local government in tervention.
Outline of the Circumstances around Rural Areas of Japan and Korea
In addition to the regional characteristics of the two countries, the regional impacts of the institutional measures against the Kaso phe nomenon are also quite distinct.
Due to the reorganization of the administrative system in Japan after World War II, local governments received a significant amount of administrative autonomy (Nakano 1992). Moreover, owing to the industrial decentralization policy since the latter part of 1970s, local labor markets have grown, or were newly formed in rural Japan. At the same time, the Central Government of Japan started to pour investments into the rural areas as a reaction to the rapid rural depopula tion and broad collapse of local communities. These investments have greatly contributed to raising the living standards of rural areas.
Contrary to the Japanese case, the delivery systems of local policies are strictly under the responsibility of the Central Government in Korea. Myun2 as the lowest administrative unit of rural Korea has neither administrative nor financial autonomy.
Moreover, the Central Government has been more apt to financially invest in urban areas under the growth center strategy resulting in the lack of established local labor market. This has caused a shortage of developmental funds at the local government level (Gun: county) although its autonomy started in the 1990s.
In spite of the differences mentioned above, the two countries have many similarities re garding their national development strategy and cultural background.
But the main impe tus of regional characteristics of Kaso areas in both countries shows clear contrasts. Namely, national policies played a decisive role in the formation of regional characteristics of Kaso areas in Korea, while the market force played a more important role in Japan (Kim 1997a) .
In the next chapter, each country will be introduced from a comparative perspective, focusing on development policies, changes of endogenous self-organizations and roles of local governments.
As the Japanese case, Namiai village a small, remote mountainous municipal ity with heavy snowfall was selected. The Korean case is Chundang village, which has almost same characteristics as the Japanese vil lage except for its administrative status. All the data and descriptions are based on the author's fieldwork, which was carried out in 1995/96 for Namiai village and in 1994/95 for Chundang village, respectively.
Materials
for the Discussion: What Happened in the Study Areas?
Case of Japan: Namiai Village3
Outline Namiai village is located in Nagano Prefec .
ture in central Japan ( Figure 1 ). The population of the village is 778 as of 1995. There are 264 households and the ratio of the aged (over 65 years old) is almost 30 percent. Most of the settlements are located 1,000 meters above sea level with very heavy snowfall in winter. This village lost almost half of its population during the period 1952 to 1995. Regarding depopula tion rates, those of Namiai village are more drastic than those of total Kaso areas, but the trends are very similar (Figure 2 ). In the drastic change of depopulation rates, resort develop ment, which has been the general way of devel opment in many Kaso areas has played a deci sive role. Considering these characteristics, Namiai village can represent a typical Kaso vil lage in Japan.
Resort development since 1960s
As an attempt to counteract the Kaso phe nomenon, since the late 1960s, Namiai village has implemented the pioneering and grass roots resort development, more specifically as a ski resort. Under the leadership of the village headman, the residents founded a company for resort development with the intention to "uti lize the resource for ourselves by our own knowledge and efforts". They also stated, "never accept outside capital , never sell the land, never go into debt". Since the financial condition of the village at that time was very weak, the residents voluntarily invested in the company.
The ratio of their investment was just fifty percent. The success of the first at tempt inspired the residents as well as the vil lage government, to continue to invest in the resort development thereafter.
As the result of grass-roots efforts, tourists in this village have increased from 80 thousand in 1967 to the present 300 thousand (Figure 3 ). This rise in tourism is related to the increase of employment and income. At the peak time, more than 100 people were employed by resort related facilities in a total population of less than 800 persons, and the rapid depopulation stopped at this point. Moreover, the industrial structure of the village changed drastically (Figure 4 ).
The results of the resort development
The changes occurred in the early 1980s. Owing to the improvement of access to the central city Ida, people were able to commute to the city. At the same time, the residents pre ferred working in the city rather than at the resort facilities. As a result, only 6 percent of the residents were employed in spite of rapid growth of the tourist industry.
As the tourist industry grew, the tourist com panies fell under control of the logic of capital itself. This in turn prevented the voluntary involvement of residents. From the 1970s, the Central Government of Japan started to imple ment financial transfer to the local govern ments on a large scale. As a result, with the subsidy from the Central Government the vil lage government was able to continue to invest in the resort development. In other words, the village government didn't need to negotiate with the residents on their policies.
But at times these policies opposed the wishes of the residents who needed more investment in edu cation, health and other public services for themselves rather than for tourists.
And the village government no longer needed to organ ize people for the community mobilization. As a result the foundation of the village govern ment changed from the community to the Cen tral Government.
In the meantime, with the increase in public investment, only the construction sector could continue the rapid growth. Finally the owners of construction companies appeared as the new political elite, with the result that unnecessary public construction by subsidy increased, such as the construction of a new playground in a forest, which is located less than five minutes walk from the school playground.
Just a few years before, the village government had al ready enlarged the school playground for the use of all residents. With less than 800 popula tions they certainly did not need two play grounds, let alone destroying a forest to build one of them. In short, the resort development of Namiai village deteriorated to a dependent one. This was due to their over-attention to econom ic aspects such as employment while ignoring social aspects such as organizing the develop ment actors.
The institutional intervention resulted in two conflicting phenomena, namely strengthening of the financial autonomy of municipal govern ments and weakening of the capabilities of self reliance. As a result, most of the traditionally endogenous organizations of community have been disorganized or reorganized under the leadership of the municipal government.
With the change of the industrial structure and the consequent change of value system of the residents, the endogenous self-organizations changed roles to become pseudo-organizations of the local government.
Finally it should be pointed out that these phenomena are widely observed in most of Kaso areas in Japan.
Case of South Korea: Chundang Village4
Outline Chundang village is located in Hoengsung County, central Korea ( Figure 5) . As of 1995, the population is 310 persons. This village lost its population at an annual rate of over 4 percent in the 1980s. More than 80 percent of the acreage is covered by forestry land and about 60 percent of cultivated lands are dry fields. Though it takes about 30 minutes from the village to Hoengsung town by car, it is not easy for most of the residents to commute to the town because they don't possess their own car. Therefore, most of the residents are en gaged in small scale agriculture management.
After the late 1980s two contrasting events occurred in Chundang village. On one hand, the depopulation phenomenon induced rural depri commercial crops as they negotiated the price of harvested hops with the company. The social learning through contracted cultivation made the once conservative farmers open to change. In the late 1980s this helped them to adopt new crops quickly after the end of the contract cultivation of hops. Actually, most of the farmers who had cultivated hops, changed to high profit crops such as vegetables, mush room and ginseng just after the decline of hops cultivation. As of 1995, the number of farmers who had introduced high profit crops reached half of the total farmers. Along with this sub jective factor, there have been some objective factors in commercial-based agriculture after the late 1980s. Firstly, agricultural machinery for rice cultivation, such as cultivator, tractor, rice planting machine and combined-harvester, was introduced from the early 1980s. The in troduction to machinery created labor force re serves that allowed for the production of high profit crops other than rice. However, the ma chinery was usually expensive so that individu al introduction of such machinery did not meet the cost-benefit. Therefore collective purchas ing had been common in the introduction of agricultural machinery. Secondly, a new forwarding system has been implemented by the agricultural cooperative since the middle of 1980s, in which a national network for agricul tural products was established with the im provement of roads in rural areas. Before the forwarding system by the cooperative, the farmer's only alternative was to use the Broker system. With this system the farmers sold their produce to a broker, who bought the farmer's produce wholesale before it was harvested. This was a high risk but potentially a high yield method. But with this system, farmers did not have the market statistics so they suffered losses. Under the forwarding system, the coop erative would collect the farmer's produce and sell it to the wholesale market everyday.
In return for this service, the farmers had to pay the transportation fee and a small percentage of the profit to the cooperative. With the forward ing system the farmers had more control over their produce.
With the changes mentioned above, the farmers of Chundang village made three adjust ments.
Firstly, they became specialized by planting high profit crops. Secondly, they became part-time farmers. Less than 10 percent of farmers could find a job in non-agricultural sectors such as construction owing to the weak ness of the local labor market. In these cases wives commonly were in charge of agricultural management, entrusting some part of farming to specialized full-time farmers. Lastly, most of the aging farmers once again became self sufficient, renting most of their lands to the full-time farmers.
Changes in standard of living
Rapid decrease in the population led to a decrease in the number of services offered by the public and private sectors. Before the intro duction of mass media the farmers were con tent with their standard of living. Due to the introduction of the market economy to rural areas, mass media exposed the farmers to an alternative lifestyle which created a desire to In the 1980s, the Central Government im plemented the policy for the distribution of agricultural machinery, called the 'policy of ma chinery equipped small-size group'. The gov ernment was willing to subsidize half of the machinery cost if approximately five to ten farmers organized a group. In order to meet this policy, 'Dure' organizations6 were mobilized in Chundang village. A 'Dure' organization can be defined as a traditional labor collective or ganization in rural Korea. As a result, the 'Dure' organizations were reorganized according to the agricultural machines subsidized by the policy. In the process of reorganization, the function of the organizations became more specialized. And this in turn strengthened the self-organizing capabilities of the community. In this case, the essence of the organizations is still the 'Dure', endogenous self-organization, although on administrative documents they are counted as 'machinery equipped small-size groups'. In other words, the 'Dure', an endoge nous self-organization, had the leverage to negotiate with governmental policy.
An Alternative Theoretical Framework: Foundation of Endogenous Self-organization
The basic unit of rural communities is the family or household. A family should get mate rials and/or services for their daily life and production activities from market, administra tion or community.
And the interactions among them can be defined as bargaining with market, negotiation with administration and organizing activities in a community, respec tively. If we consider the efforts to get materi als and/or services as 'cost', then each interac tion is supposed to be constrained by bargain ing cost in the market, negotiation cost with administration and community organizing cost, respectively (Figure 6-a) . For example, they sell their home production and/or buy daily necessities from the bargaining activities in market. And they participate in the benefit of education and health through negotiation with administration. Also, they mobilize/manage common resources and/or identify themselves as social beings. Looking for a job in a nearby city to compensate for shortages in the family's total income can be interpreted as a bargaining activity with his/her own labor force in the market.
Moreover, when an individual wants to bar gain with the market or negotiate with the administration, the local community often me diates. A peasant, who is incompetent as far as bargaining with market and so uses a coopera tive to pursue agricultural production, is an example of bargaining with market through a local community. Residents, who lack negotia tion capabilities, use a district member to peti tion to a village assembly, can be interpreted as individuals attempting to negotiate with ad ministration via local community. The founda tion of an endogenous self-organization in a rural community can be explained by the inter actions of the above three factors.
The types of materials and/or services re ceived from market, administration or commu nity, vary according to the society and changes of social circumstances.
And the relative cost of each factor regulates the source of necessities and services (Figure 6-b) . In short, if the bargaining cost decreased because the market became more accessible or stable due to eco nomic growth, and/or if the negotiation cost decreased due to the substantial improvement of the municipality's financial condition, the organizing cost would increase relatively. People would then be willing to rely on the market or administration for necessities and/or services as opposed to the local community.
But, there is a very special sphere that exists at the community which does not exist at market and/or administration level. This sphere is the distribution of benefits by policy implementation or the mediation of social con flict. That's why in rural development the role of endogenous self-organization is so important. 
An Alternative Interpretation and Concluding Remarks
If we adopt the above theoretical framework, the two cases above can be interpreted as follows:
The 
